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Abstract
The desire to avoid rousing community hostility may encourage firms to
behave in an environmentally responsible manner. It has been conjectured
that such ‘informal regulation’ could effectively replace formal intervention
in some settings, and usefully complement it in others. We explore these
conjectures with mixed results. Informal regulation is necessarily less efficient
than a well-designed formal alternative and the pattern of green behaviour
induced by the threat of community hostility may increase or decrease welfare.
The existence of community pressure may increase or decrease the optimal
calibration of a formal intervention (in this case an environmental tax) and
may complement or detract from the incentives generated by an optimally-
calibrated tax.
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1 Introduction
In many settings the formal incentives for a firm not to damage the environment are
weak, either because legal strictures are not in place or are ineffectually enforced.
There may still, however, be substantial incentives for firms to exercise restraint in
order to avoid community hostility:
When formal regulation is weak or absent, communities can often
use other channels to force pollution abatement by local factories in a
process of “informal regulation” (Pargal and Wheeler (1996: 1314))
Much recent work has pointed to the scope of informal regulation, particularly in
developing economies where formal governance structures are typically weak. van
Rooij (2010a) investigates the extent to which community pressure can serve as
an alternative to traditional command and control methods as a mechanism for
pollution regulation in lower- and middle-income countries. But similar informal
incentives are equally apparent in richer economies where the rationale for recent
disclosure programmes in the United States and Europe, for example, is that they
may improve environmental compliance. Various commentators have suggested that
such disclosure programmes could be a viable alternative to formal regulatory inter-
vention in some settings, or could complement such interventions (see, for example,
Tietenberg (1998)). We explore both hypotheses here.
Pargal and Wheeler (1996) provide an early and important contribution to the
economic analysis of informal regulation. They develop a market-type model for
environmental services in a community. The polluting firm relies on supply of ser-
vices from the community (employees, contractors, etc.) and/or on demand for its
services from that community. The terms on which these inputs and outputs are
traded are sensitive to community hostility. A firm that is known to damage the
local environment may face a hostile community and so find it harder or more ex-
pensive to attract and motivate workers, for example, or harder to sell its products,
generating informal ‘penalties’ for poor environmental performance.
The focus of recent case study and empirical work has been on estimating the
strength of informal incentives and understanding the mechanics of such community
pressure – in other words the linkages from firm behaviour to community hostility,
and onward from community hostility to informal penalties. “Without recourse to
legal enforcement of existing regulations (if any), they must rely on the leverage
1
provided by social pressure on workers and managers, adverse publicity, the threat
(or use) of violence against the plant, and pressure through politicians, local admin-
istrators, or religious leaders” (Pargal and Wheeler (1996: 1315)). ‘Community’ can
mean different things in different contexts, and is not necessarily defined by geog-
raphy. Customers (actual or prospective) may, for example, be widely dispersed, as
may investors. These are both groups that designers of disclosure programs have
sought to co-opt as potential ‘informal regulators’.
Informal regulation is likely to have most impact if community hostility translates
into reduced profits, through increased cost, decreased revenue, or both. In that case
profit-motivated firms will choose socially-desirable actions in order to maintain
community support. The label ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) has been
used to mean a variety of things in recent years, but the instrumentalist or strategic
view of CSR is that profit-maximizing firms engage in CSR as an investment in
reputational capital.1 Lyon and Maxwell (2008) and Reinhardt et al. (2008) provide
some useful discussion and context on the interpretations of CSR. The notion of
doing things to maintain a supportive community is similar to the idea of stakeholder
management in the business literature (Kassinis and Vafeas (2006)).
Dasgupta et al. (2000) examine data on plant-level compliance with air quality
standards in Mexico and conclude that ‘extra legal’ factors (their term for com-
munity pressure) play an important role in compliance decisions, sometimes even
leading to over -compliance. Wang (2000) estimates compliance incentives in a Chi-
nese context and concludes that “... the implicit price from community pressure is
at least as high as the explicit price (in the form of the pollution levy)”. Hettige et
al. (1996) provide empirical support for the impact of informal regulation in Asia,
noting that “... despite weak or non-existent formal regulation, there are many clean
plants in South and Southeast Asia”. Evidence from developed economies includes
Foulon et al. (2002) in Canada and Pargal et al. (1997) for the United States.
Environmental performance may be linked to informal penalties through a vari-
ety of channels. An environmentally dirty firm may be penalized in the labor market
(the terms on which it can hire workers – e.g. Brekke and Nyborg (2008)), capital
1The firms in our model will be profit maximizers rather than altruists. Baron (2001) is amongst
those who contend that the CSR label should only be applied when the motivation for good deeds
is altruistic, not part of a profit-maximizing strategy (“The perspective taken here is that both
motivation and performance are required for actions to receive the CSR label” (Baron (2001:9)).
CSR in our paper will be defined by performance – all firms in our model maximize expected profit
streams. This is the more usual use of the term amongst economists.
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market (the terms on which it can raise capital – e.g. Badrinath and Bolster (1996))
and the product market (reduced demand for its outputs – Roe et al. (2001)). The
product market premium for superior environmental performance has received par-
ticular attention recently and there are extensive literatures on ‘green marketing’ (see
Becker-Olson et al. (2006) for a survey), green premia and eco-labels (Pelsmacker
et al. (2006), Kotchen (2006)). Furthermore, poor environmental performance can
lead to local or wide-spread consumer boycotts (Klein et al. (2004), Innes (2006)).
It may also induce ‘direct action’ such as vandalism (van Rooij (2010b)).
Our objective in this paper is to consider the efficiency of the incentives that the
threat of community hostility generates. The environmental performance of a firm
and community attitude towards that firm can be expected to interact through time.
The behaviour of the firm may depend upon community attitude, whilst community
attitude will itself be sensitive to that firm’s choice of actions. A community might
turn against a firm it observes as being environmentally irresponsible or ‘dirty’, but
the firm may be able to repair its reputation by subsequent clean behaviour (see,
for example, Parsons (2011)). Since community attitude and firm behaviour change
through time it is natural to develop a dynamic model to explore their evolution.
We present a model in which at any given moment community attitude towards
a particular firm is either ‘hostile’ or ‘supportive’. We formulate a Markov-type
regime-switching model in which this community attitude evolves through time in
a way that is sensitive – probabilistically – to the firm’s environmental choices. In
the basic version of our model we assume that community attitude evolves purely in
response to the firm’s actions in the most recent period. This is a common modeling
simplification in Markov models. In an extension we show that the qualitative
insights of the model are sustained in a setting where community attitudes depend
on a longer history of a firm’s actions.
In assessing the welfare implications of informal regulation, we consider the frac-
tion of the time the firm engages in environmentally-responsible behaviour. We
focus on the steady-state distribution of time spent in each state, but it should be
understood that underpinning this is a rich dynamic story. Steady state does not
imply here that behaviour is unchanging – in the steady state community attitude
can be ‘bouncing’ backwards and forwards between periods of support and hostility,
and the firm’s behaviour between clean and dirty.
Markov models, which allow a key state variable to vary stochastically through
time, have been used in many areas of the social sciences, including economics.
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They have been used to model the evolution of individual tastes and behaviours
(Pearson and West (2003), Netzer (2008), Biehl (2001)) and mass attitudes (Yu and
Pei (2009)). In Lagunoff (2006) the policy bias of an incumbent regulator evolves
through time according to a Markov process, while in Blomberg et al. (2004) the
social preconditions for terrorism do. Greenberg (1984), Harrington (1988) and
Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) have used it in regulatory compliance settings.
Harrington (1988) is probably the paper closest in spirit to ours, with the attitude
of the regulatory agency towards a particular firm varying through time in a way
that is sensitive to that firm’s compliance history.
The key results of our paper can be categorized threefold: (a) informal mecha-
nisms are not as efficient as well-designed formal ones; (b) informal regulation may
be good or bad for welfare; (c) informal and formal mechanisms may be substitutes
or complements. The generally optimistic views that community pressure has the
potential to replace formal governance, and that formal and informal incentives for
regulatory compliance are necessarily additive in their contribution to welfare, need
to be treated with caution.
2 Model
A firm operates in a community in each of an infinite sequence of periods. For ease
of analysis we treat the community as a single entity, and assume that at any given
moment its attitude towards the firm is either ‘hostile’ (denoted as h) or ‘supportive’
(denoted as s). If the community is supportive the firm’s gross profit per period is
pi(s), while if the community is hostile periodic profit is pi(h), with
pi(s) > pi(h) > 0.
The assumption that pi(s) > pi(h) – a supportive community is more profitable
for the firm – is pivotal to the analysis. It drives the profit-motivated firm to act
in a manner that avoids community hostility, providing the potential for informal
regulation to work. The precise mechanism that links hostility to lower profits is
black-boxed and not important for current purposes.2
2Our preferred working assumption is that community hostility translates into a weakening of
demand for the output of the firm: either a subset of consumers decide not to buy from that firm,
or continue to buy but have a lower willingness to pay. We use this to motivate the welfare function
that we adopt later.
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The firm decides each period whether to behave in a manner that is ‘clean’ or
‘dirty’. We can think of this as a model of compliance, with the binary choice
corresponding to compliance or non-compliance with some legal requirement (where
one exists). But the formulation allows for a more general interpretation, where
firms choose to be clean because it is seen by the local community to be the ‘right
thing to do’.
We assume that being clean is costly, but the value of that cost is uncertain. The
cost to the firm of type i of being clean is ci per period where ci is drawn from the
distribution F (c) with associated density function f(c). The distribution is common
knowledge, but the realization is observed privately by the firm. In contrast, it is
costless to be dirty. Importantly, the firm can switch over time between these actions,
clean and dirty, and does so in response to incentives.
We begin our analysis by assuming that the community is initially supportive
towards the firm. If the firm chooses ‘dirty’ the community may be roused to hostil-
ity. Concretely, we assume that if the firm chooses dirty in period t the probability
that the supportive community will be rendered hostile by the start of period (t+1)
is β ∈ [0, 1]. In contrast, the community remains supportive towards any firm that
behaves in a responsible manner: that is, if the firm chooses ‘clean’ in period t,
community support is retained with probability 1 in the next period.
The value of responsible behaviour lies not merely in its ability to retain com-
munity support, but also in its redemptive effects. We assume that where the firm’s
previous action has antagonized the community, the hostility may be calmed by sub-
sequent clean behaviour. In particular if facing a hostile community the firm chooses
‘clean’ in period t, then the probability that the community will turn supportive in
period (t+ 1) is γ ∈ [0, 1]. In contrast, continued dirty behaviour leads hostility to
persist with certainty.
The state of community feelings towards the firm can, then, be described as a
Markov process, where the transition across states s and h depends on the current
action chosen by the firm. The pair of parameters β and γ capture the process of
community attitude formation – how ready it is to withdraw support in response to
episodes of dirtiness, and how readily calmed it is when that dirtiness ceases. These
parameters would depend, among other things, on how informed the community is
– an alert community might be more responsive to the firm’s actions, with higher
values for both β and γ.
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The firm is a profit maximizer (recall our earlier comments on the usage of the
label ‘corporate social responsibility’ in these settings) and chooses its actions to
maximize the present value of current and future payoffs over an infinite horizon;
future values are discounted using a periodic discount factor δ < 1. In general,
the firm’s time profile of choices can be complex. However, we rely here on the
well-known ergodic theorem for such Markov decision problems: in such cases the
optimal policy of the firm is stationary, in that decisions at any time depend only
on the current state of system.
It is sufficient, then, to look at policies in which the firm chooses a state-
dependent action. A decision at any time is a map from the set of states (supportive
or hostile, s and h) to the set of actions (clean or dirty, C and D). A policy refers
to a rule for making decisions over time. The set of feasible policies is given by a
map Ω : {s× h} → {C × D} where a policy specifies an action for each state. With
two states and two possible actions, there are four distinct policies.
Let Ωasah denote the policy in which the firm chooses action as when the com-
munity is supportive and ah when it is hostile. For instance, Ω
CD denotes a policy in
which the firm chooses ‘clean’ when the community is supportive, but ‘dirty’ when
it is hostile. With policy ΩDD it picks ‘dirty’ regardless of the state of community
attitude.
Of particular interest are ΩCC and ΩDC, which involve the use of responsible
behaviour – choosing clean – in the face of a hostile community. Policy ΩCC involves
responsible behaviour even when the community is supportive, and we will refer
to such activity as ‘retentive CSR’. Policy ΩDC is more opportunistic – it involves
responsible behaviour only when the firm has lost community support. Since it does
so in order to restore community support we will refer to this policy as ‘redemptive
CSR’.
In what follows we evaluate the expected return to various stationary policies as
a function of ci, the cost of clean behaviour. It turns out that by choosing Ω
CD the
firm can do no better than by choosing ΩCC or ΩDD, so we can ignore ΩCD whenever
both those policies are available. Hence we examine how the firm’s optimal choice
among the three remaining policies varies with ci. For a particular distribution
of firm types this will allow us to characterize the likelihood of socially responsible
behaviour, and thereby to assess the efficiency of the pattern of behaviour generated
by the informal regulation.
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2.1 Retentive CSR
Policy ΩCC prompts the firm to choose ‘clean’ regardless of its current standing in
the community. Starting with supportive community, consistent clean behaviour
retains support of the community, giving the firm a net profit of [pi(s) − ci] per
period indefinitely. The expected payoff to this policy is the value of that stream of
payoffs, capitalized using discount factor δ.
ECC(s, ci) =
[pi(s)− ci]
1− δ .
For notational ease we define Π(s) = pi(s)
1−δ to be the present discounted value of gross
profits with a perpetually supportive community, and Ci =
ci
1−δ to be the present
discounted value of the costs ci incurred every period. Then, with slight abuse of
notation, we can write the expected payoff to policy ΩCC as
ECC(s, Ci) = Π(s)− Ci. (1)
2.2 Redemptive CSR
Policy ΩDC is more opportunistic. When the community is supportive, the firm picks
‘dirty’, thereby avoiding cost ci. However if the community turns hostile the firm
picks ‘clean’ in an effort to restore community support. In essence, the firm’s CSR
is purely redemptive in intent.3
Once again, we evaluate the expected payoff to this policy starting with a com-
munity that is supportive. The expected payoff can be expressed recursively as
EDC(s, ci) = pi(s) + δ [βEDC(h, ci) + (1− β)EDC(s, ci)]. (2)
To see why note that, under this policy, the firm earns pi(s) in the initial period and
the outcome next period is stochastic: with probability β the community turns hos-
tile, with continuation value EDC(h, ci), and with probability (1−β) the community
remains supportive.
To compute the continuation value EDC(h, ci), note that this redemptive pol-
icy calls for clean behaviour in response to hostility: that generates current payoff
3Consider, for example, BP’s actions in the wake of the Deep Horizon disaster, which Parsons
(2011) labels as ‘reputation repair’.
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[pi(h) − ci], with a stochastic future outcome: with probability γ the hostile com-
munity will be calmed by the firm’s conversion to clean behaviour, and with the
residual probability it will remain hostile. We have
EDC(h, ci) = [pi(h)− ci] + δ [γEDC(s, ci) + (1− γ)EDC(h, ci)]. (3)
Equations (2) and (3) can be solved together to obtain a closed-form solution. To
save notation, we define Λ = (1− δ(1− β)) and Ψ = (1− δ(1− γ)), and, as before,
we write Π(h) = pi(h)
1−δ . We then obtain
EDC(s, Ci) = ωDC Π(s) + (1− ωDC) [Π(h)− Ci], (4)
where
ωDC =
(1−δ)Ψ
ΨΛ−δ2γβ . (5)
Effectively, under policy ΩDC the firm transitions stochastically between the two
states. When the community is supportive the firm chooses to be dirty and earns
pi(s) per period. As and when dirty behaviour tips the community into hostility, the
firm switches to clean and earns pi(h) − ci per period till the community becomes
supportive again. The weights ωDC and (1−ωDC) capture the average time spent in
the two states, given the stochastic process underlying the evolution of community
attitudes.
2.3 No CSR
Under policy ΩDD the firm never engages in clean behaviour, regardless of commu-
nity attitude. Starting with an initially supportive community, the present value of
the payoff to this policy is
EDD(s, ci) = pi(s) + δ [βEDD(h, ci) + (1− β)EDD(s, ci)]. (6)
During the initial ‘honeymoon’ period (which could be a single period or longer)
the firm is able to extract profit pi(s) per period, without any expenditure on being
clean. But after that initial support has been dissipated, the firm simply accepts its
unpopularity and settles for periodic payoffs pi(h) indefinitely. It is easy to see that
EDD(h, ci) = Π(h). (7)
Combining (6) and (7), we have
EDD(s, Ci) = ωDDΠ(s) + (1− ωDD)Π(h), (8)
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where
ωDD = 1−δΛ . (9)
2.4 Firm’s choice of optimal policy
The firm understands the benefits to maintaining community support – that bad
behaviour can induce hostility but this can be assuaged by subsequent good be-
haviour. The optimal CSR policy for the firm – we denote this as Ω∗(ci, β, γ) – is
the one that maximizes the net present value of expected returns detailed above,
given the parameter values ci, β and γ. Given the stationarity of the environment,
the optimal policy is time invariant and is not sensitive to choice of initial state.4
Our focus is on how the firm’s optimal choice depends on the realization of cost,
ci. It is easy to compare the policies if clean behaviour is costless: we have
ECC(s, 0) > EDC(s, 0) > EDD(s, 0) > 0.
If clean behaviour is costless, retentive CSR policy is optimal as it avoids any hos-
tility that damages periodic payoffs. That EDC(s, 0) > EDD(s, 0) is equally intuitive
and says that if ever the firm were to face a hostile community it should engage in
the (costless) action to restore support.
More generally, the expected returns to the three policies are linear in ci: while
ECC(s, ci) and EDC(s, ci) are decreasing in ci, though at different rates, EDD(s, ci) is
invariant to changes in ci. Using (1) and (4), it is easy to see E
DC(s, ci) ≥ ECC(s, ci)
if and only if
ωDCΠ(s) + (1− ωDC)[Π(h)− Ci] ≥ Π(s)− Ci,
or, equivalently, using (5), if and only if
ci ≥
(
δβ
Ψ
)
[pi(s)− pi(h)] ≡ cˆ. (10)
Compared to retentive CSR (policy ΩCC), redemptive CSR (policy ΩDC) saves on
the cost of cleanliness during periods in which the community is supportive but
requires the firm to accept possible intervals of community hostility as a consequence.
Whether that is a profitable trade-off depends on the cost of clean behaviour: if ci
exceeds the critical threshold cˆ, the expected return to the more opportunistic policy
ΩDC is greater than the return to policy ΩCC.
4This second feature ensures that our assumption that communities are initially supportive can
be made without loss of generality.
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By a similar logic, using (4) and (8), we find that the expected return to policy
ΩDC is greater than the return to policy ΩDD if and only if
ci ≤
(
δγ
Λ
)
[pi(s)− pi(h)] ≡ ˆˆc. (11)
This is equally intuitive. Being clean constitutes an investment by the firm in
improving and/or maintaining community attitudes. If the firm finds cleanliness very
expensive it will never find such spending worthwhile, and ˆˆc defines the threshold
beyond which that is the case.
Combining (10) and (11), it is clear that policy ΩDC is optimal for the firm if
and only if ci lies in the interval [cˆ, ˆˆc]. Whether such an interval exists depends on
the values of cˆ and ˆˆc. Comparing (γ/Λ) and (β/Ψ), as defined earlier, leads to the
following.
Remark 1 cˆ < ˆˆc if and only if β < γ.
The restriction that β < γ requires that the community is sufficiently ‘forgiving’:
that clean behaviour be more likely to restore community support than dirty be-
haviour is to trigger hostility. If β = γ, we have cˆ = ˆˆc.
Figure 1 plots the profitability of the three policies for alternative values of ci,
for the case where β < γ. For ci below the lower threshold cˆ the retentive CSR
policy ΩCC is most profitable; above the higher threshold ˆˆc the no CSR policy ΩDD
dominates. For the intervening range, the redemptive CSR policy ΩDC is best.
Given a sufficiently dispersed distribution F (ci) of costs, there is an interval of low
realizations for which the firm chooses to be clean at all times and an interval of
high realizations for which it will never choose clean. As long as cˆ < ˆˆc, there exists
a central interval of mid-range cost realizations for which the firm chooses clean
behaviour only when the community is hostile. We formalize this as:
Proposition 1 Let β < γ and let cˆ and ˆˆc be as defined above. The optimal CSR
policy for the firm is
ΩCC if ci ≤ cˆ Retentive CSR
ΩDC if cˆ < ci < ˆˆc Redemptive CSR
ΩDD if ˆˆc ≤ ci No CSR
10
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Figure 1: Optimal policy as function of ci when β < γ
How does the optimal policy vary with ci when β > γ? Adapting the previous
arguments, we can show that for this case policy ΩDC is never optimal, so the choice
is essentially between ΩCC and ΩDD. Further ECC(s, ci) ≥ EDD(s, ci) if and only if
ci ≤ c˜, where
c˜ ≡ ( δβ
Λ
)
[pi(s)− pi(h)]. (12)
In this case the optimal policy switches from ΩCC for ci below the threshold c˜, to
ΩDD above that threshold, without any intervening range where ΩDC is optimal.
Proposition 2 Let β > γ and let c˜ be as defined above. The optimal CSR policy
for the firm is
ΩCC if ci ≤ c˜ Retentive CSR
ΩDD if ci > c˜ No CSR
We later explore the implications of this case in our welfare analysis.
2.5 Steady state
There is a potential divergence between the pay-offs to an optimal policy during the
initial ‘honeymoon’ period (associated with the assumption of an initially supportive
community) and the flow of payoffs in steady state. In what follows we move to
steady-state considerations. For any chosen policy Ω, the steady state under the
Markov process would typically imply continuous transitions across states, with a
limiting distribution of average time spent in each state. Some policies may result
in ‘absorbing states’ but in general steady state does not imply that behaviour is
unchanging – in a steady state community attitude can be ‘bouncing’ backwards
and forwards between periods of support and hostility, and the firm’s behaviour
between clean and dirty.
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For any policy Ω and the associated steady state distribution, we define p(Ω) to
be the fraction of periods in which the firm ends up choosing ‘clean’. The evaluation
of p(Ω) is straightforward for some policies. In particular, policy ΩCC requires the
firm to be always clean so p(ΩCC) = 1 (with s being an ‘absorbing state’). Under
policy ΩDD we have p(ΩDD) = 0.
Consider the case in which the firm adopts policy ΩDC, which calls for clean
behaviour only when the community is hostile. In steady state the fraction of time
that the firm spends in each state is given by the limiting distribution of a Markov
process with the following transition matrix:[
(1− β) β
γ (1− γ)
]
.
It is easy to verify that
p(ΩDC) =
β
β + γ
,
the expected steady-state fraction of time in which the community is hostile under
this policy. The firm is dirty for the residual fraction of time γ
γ+β
, when it faces a
supportive community. The expected steady-state return to policy ΩDC is
EDC(Ci) = ω∗DCΠ(s) + (1− ω∗DC)[Π(h)− Ci], (13)
where
ω∗DC =
γ
γ + β
. (14)
In contrast, the steady-state returns to policies ΩCC and ΩDD are
ECC(Ci) = Π(s)− Ci, (15)
and
EDD(Ci) = Π(h). (16)
Propositions 1 and 2 had characterized the firm’s optimal policy given an initially
supportive population. The steady-state versions of those results are analogous.
Replicating our previous steps, we define the lower and upper cost thresholds in
order to characterize the optimal policy:
c∗(β, γ) =
(
β
γ
)
[pi(s)− pi(h)], (17)
and
c∗(β, γ) =
(
γ
β
)
[pi(s)− pi(h)]. (18)
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Figure 2: Propensity to clean conduct as function of ci, when β < γ
Proposition 3 Let β < γ and let c∗ and c∗ be as defined above. The optimal
steady-state CSR policy for the firm given cost realization ci is
ΩCC if ci ≤ c∗ Retentive CSR
ΩDC if c∗ < ci < c∗ Redemptive CSR
ΩDD if c∗ ≤ ci No CSR
Figure 2 plots the expected amount of time that the firm spends engaged in
clean conduct, in steady state, given its realization of ci. As before Ω
∗ denotes the
optimal policy. For low cost realizations (ci < c∗) the firm finds it optimal to choose
ΩCC, so always chooses clean behaviour: we have p(Ω∗| ci < c∗) = p(ΩCC) = 1. For
high realizations (ci > c
∗) it is optimal to choose ΩDD, so the firm is never clean. In
the intervening range the firm is clean for a fraction p(ΩDC) = β
β+γ
of the time.
For any distribution F (c), we can compute the ex-ante probability of clean con-
duct.5
Remark 2 Let β < γ. Given cost distribution F (c), in steady state the expected
fraction of time that a firm chooses clean behaviour is∫
p(Ω∗|ci)f(c)dc =
∫ c∗
0
f(c)dc+
∫ c∗
c∗
(
β
β + γ
)
f(c)dc.
The values obtained earlier for the thresholds permit a more concise expression.
Write pi = pi(s) − pi(h), so c∗ = βγpi and c∗ = γβpi. Then, the expected fraction of
time the firm expects to be clean is
F (c∗) +
(
β
β+γ
)
[F (c∗)− F (c∗)] = γβ+γF
(
β
γ
pi
)
+ β
β+γ
F
(
γ
β
pi
)
.
5Note that the current model is presented for a single firm located in a single community. If
however we extend to think of a population of communities, embedded in each is a single firm, the
expression becomes the expected fraction of firms engaged in good behaviour in a given period.
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What if β > γ? Here the redemptive CSR policy ΩDC is never optimal. As
ci varies, the optimal policy switches from Ω
CC to ΩDD, with the critical threshold
being pi = pi(s)− pi(h).
Proposition 4 Let β ≥ γ. The optimal steady-state CSR policy for firm i in steady
state is
ΩCC if ci ≤ pi Retentive CSR
ΩDD if ci > pi No CSR
Remark 3 If β ≥ γ, in steady state the fraction of time that the firm expects to be
engaged in clean behaviour is∫
p(Ω∗|ci)f(c)dc =
∫ pi
0
f(c)dc = F (pi).
In what follows, we focus our attention on the case where β < γ taking care to
identify, at relevant places, the implications of departing from this assumption.
3 Community pressure and welfare
Having explored the optimal choice of CSR policy for the firm, we turn next to
normative questions. Is community hostility welfare-improving? How close is the
resulting set of incentives to the first-best outcome?
We focus on the properties of the steady state outcome for our welfare analysis.
This approach, quite usual in models of this sort, has the advantage of abstracting
from any bias due to arbitrary choice of initial state.
In developing a welfare function there is the issue of treatment of the profit
‘penalty’ that the community imposes by withdrawing its support, namely pi =
pi(s) − pi(h). In particular, does that penalty impose a real resource burden upon
welfare, or is simply a transfer away from the reference firm? The appropriate
weight on the penalty in social welfare might vary with the channel through which
the community vents its hostility. If members of a hostile local community pick up
rocks and throw them through factory windows, then the penalty can reasonably be
considered a welfare burden. However, if members of that community decide not to
buy services from the firm that has aroused hostility, but rather take their custom
to some other firm in the same economy, then the penalty is merely a transfer and
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should not appear as a net burden on welfare. In general, we could introduce a
coefficient k ∈ [0, 1] to capture the fraction of penalty pi that is a real resource
burden in the social welfare function. However, for simplicity we implicitly set that
parameter k equal to zero and exclude the penalty term from welfare comparisons.
Nothing critical rests upon this simplification.
For exposition we will examine departures from the first-best outcome. Let b
denote the per period social benefits of clean behaviour. This is the environmental
damage avoided when the firm is clean. First-best CSR requires firm i choosing
clean every period if ci < b, and dirty otherwise. Put simply, the firm should choose
clean if and only if the private (= social) cost is less than the social benefit.
We define the expected social loss function in terms of deviations from this first-
best:
SL =
∫ b
0
(1− p(Ω∗(ci))(b− ci)f(c)dc+
∫ ∞
b
p(Ω∗(ci))(ci − b)f(c)dc,
where the optimal policy achieved through informal regulation, Ω∗(ci; β, γ), varies
with the configuration of β and γ. The first composite term captures the loss
associated with a low-cost firm (one with ci < b) not doing enough CSR relative
to the first-best outcome, and the second with a high-cost firm (ci > b) doing too
much.
We begin our analysis with the case where β < γ, so that the optimal policy for
the firm is, as in Proposition 3, determined by its cost ci relative to thresholds c∗
and c∗. We consider three distinct sub-cases, based on where b lies relative to the
interval [c∗, c∗]. Our model makes no a priori assumption about the magnitude of
b, the social benefit of clean behaviour, relative to the communal penalty pi which
affects the thresholds c∗ and c∗: if so, b could lie anywhere relative to this interval.
Consider, first, the sub-case where c∗ < b < c∗. If ci ≤ c∗ the firm chooses a
policy that entails clean behaviour at all times, consistent with first-best for this
case. For ci ≥ c∗ the firm chooses a policy that entails dirty behaviour at all time,
once again consistent with first-best. For realizations c∗ < ci < c∗ the firm chooses
policy ΩDC, which entails clean behaviour for a fraction β
γ+β
of the time. Relative
to the first-best, this is not enough for ci ∈ (c∗, b) and excessive for realizations
ci ∈ (b, c∗). The evaluation of expected social loss in this case is, then,
SL|[c∗<b<c∗] =
∫ b
c∗
(
γ
β+γ
)
(b− ci)f(c)dc+
∫ c∗
b
(
β
β+γ
)
(ci − b)f(c)dc. (19)
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Figure 3: Social loss associated with CSR: case where β < γ and c∗ < b < c∗
The welfare loss is easily understood from Figure 3. The bold line indicates the
fraction of the time the firm engages in clean behaviour as a function of cost type,
given our regime of informal regulation. In contrast, the dotted lines denotes the
first-best response given b.
Consider, next, the more extreme sub-case where b ≤ c∗. With relatively low
social benefit, clean behaviour is not socially optimal for most cost realizations.
Nonetheless the threat of community hostility drives the firm to clean behaviour
too often. We have, for this case
SL|[b<c∗] =
∫ c∗
b
(ci − b)f(c)dc+
∫ c∗
c∗
(
β
β+γ
)
(ci − b)f(c)dc. (20)
At the other extreme, if b ≥ c∗, the community penalty is so weak that clean
behaviour is not induced often enough, with expected social loss
SL|[b>c∗] =
∫ c∗
c∗
(
γ
β+γ
)
(b− ci)f(c)dc+
∫ b
c∗
(b− ci)f(c)dc. (21)
Regardless of which sub-case is relevant, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If β < γ, the expected pattern of CSR induced by the threat of
community hostility is not first-best.
To understand this note that if β < γ, as Figure 3 indicates, the firm’s CSR
policy response involves a step function p(Ω∗) with two downward steps as ci varies
from low to high values. On the other hand, the first-best policy – call it ΩFB –
calls for a single step
p(ΩFB) =
1 if ci < b,0 otherwise.
If so, community pressure is inefficient.
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Is community pressure more efficient if β > γ? Recall, from Proposition 4, that
for this case the firm chooses policy ΩCC for ci ≤ pi and ΩDD otherwise. Even in this
case first-best would be achieved through the threat of community hostility only if
the penalty pi happens to equal precisely b – a measure zero event. Generically, even
when β > γ, first-best is not achieved.
This generic inefficiency of informal regulation when β > γ is significant. While
our model uses the simplification that transition probabilities β and γ are fixed
parameters, in reality they may well depend on b, the damage associated with dirty
behaviour. The community may turn hostile more readily when the damage is large,
so that β(b) may well be an increasing function. If so, it is more likely that β(b)
exceeds γ when b is relatively large but, as our argument above shows, even then
informal regulation will not achieve first best.
In general, the divergence may be so significant that pressure-induced CSR may
be sub-optimal, not only in relation to the first-best, but relative to an outcome
that involves no CSR at all.
Proposition 6 Clean behaviour generated by the threat of community hostility may
lead to higher or lower welfare than would be the case if there was no clean behaviour.
To see why, note that net benefit of community pressure induced CSR activity,
relative to the case where there is no restraint on firm behaviour, is∫
p(Ω∗(ci))(b− ci)f(c)dc. (22)
Consider a situation where b is very small, or even non-existent; that is, assume b
tends to zero. If strong communal penalty pi results in p(Ω∗(ci)) > 0 for a signifi-
cant range of ci, CSR is welfare-reducing. On the other hand, with large b, some
CSR is better than none. In general, the effect of informal regulation on welfare is
ambiguous.
This ambiguity can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. Suppose
community hostility hurts profitability by one unit (that is, pi = 1); let β = 0.4 and
γ = 0.6, so that c∗ = 0.67 and c∗ = 1.5. Assume c is distributed uniformly in the
interval [0, 2], so that F (c) = 0.5c for 0 ≤ c ≤ 2. The optimal CSR response to
informal regulation entails the firm choosing clean behaviour with probability one if
its cost realization ci ≤ 0.67, and with probability zero for ci > 1.5. For costs in the
intervening range, the firm’s optimal policy entails clean behaviour with probability
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0.6 in steady state. Whether clean behaviour induced by such community pressure
is welfare improving or not depends on b, the social benefit of clean behaviour. It
is easy to check that if b is relatively low – less than 0.58 for the above parameter
configuration – CSR is welfare reducing. Values of b larger than this value make
CSR desirable.
The possibility that community hostility may drive firms to behave in a manner
that has real costs but limited social benefits is consistent with the empirical finding
of Dasgupta et al. (2000), who found that community pressure – what they refer to
as ‘extra legal factors’ – can induce over-compliance with regulatory standards and
an inefficient pattern of abatement decisions.
4 Extension: incorporating history
Our assumption that community attitude evolves solely in response to the current
actions of the firm seems restrictive. Popular sentiment is often quite sensitive
to the observed history of firms’ behaviour. For instance, it may be reasonable
to suppose that a community is more likely to turn hostile towards a firm whose
current dirty action is a continuation of a prior trend of bad behaviour (a ‘persistent
offender’) than when it comes against a more favorable record. How can our analysis
accommodate such richer settings?
Observe that our purpose here is not a complete characterization of the firm’s
rational policy response to informal regulation, but rather to highlight the fact that
these responses will typically involve departures from what is socially optimal. Recall
that the first-best requires that the firm choose clean if ci < b, and dirty otherwise.
This outcome does not obtain – except by contrivance – in our base model: informal
regulation is (almost surely) inefficient. In this section we adapt our model to allow
the possibility that the evolution of community attitudes may be shaped by a firm’s
past behaviour in addition to its current action, to confirm that our basic insight is
robust to this extension.
One natural way to incorporate history dependence is to enlarge the set of states
to include the firm’s recent environmental record. We continue to assume that
community attitude in any period is binary – supportive or hostile. However we can
extend the specification of a typical state at time t by including the history Ht−1 of
the firm’s past behaviour: its record of clean or dirty choices in previous periods.
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For instance, (s,Ht−1) specifies a state in which the community is supportive and
recalls the firm’s environmental history Ht−1. Transitions between supportive and
hostile communities would now depend not just upon current actions, but also on
the firm’s record of past behaviour. So the probability that dirty behaviour renders
a supportive community hostile, for example, can now be made sensitive to how the
firm behaved in the past.
The enlarged set of states supports a much richer set of policies (recall that a
policy specifies an action for the firm – clean or dirty – for every distinct state).
Any chosen policy implies a pattern of transitions across states, based on assumed
transition probabilities. Some policies may lead to absorbing states. If, for instance,
a policy of ‘always clean’ (that is, a policy of clean regardless of current state)
preserves community support with certainty, it would lead to an absorbing state
with payoff pi(s) − ci every period. On the other hand, a policy of ‘always dirty’
would typically result in an absorbing state of community hostility, with payoff pi(h)
per period. When ci, the cost of being clean, is relatively low the former policy
would be preferable; when it is relatively high, the latter would.
But there are intermediate ranges of ci in which other policies might dominate
the ‘always clean’ and ‘always dirty’ policies. Firms realize that in a dynamic setting
clean behaviour has the potential to preserve (or restore) community support, allow-
ing it to earn higher profits. At the same time a firm facing a supportive community
might be tempted to behave opportunistically, avoiding the cost of being clean es-
pecially if it believes that such lapses will not necessarily compromise community
support.
Without loss of generality, assume that some arbitrary policy Ω involves clean
behaviour for a fraction p(Ω) of the periods and is expected to retain community
support for a fraction x(Ω) of the time. The expected payoff to this policy is
EΩ(Ci) = x(Ω)Π(s) + [1− x(Ω)]Π(h)− p(Ω)Ci. (23)
Such a policy will dominate a policy of ‘always clean’ if
x(Ω)pi(s) + [1− x(Ω)]pi(h)− p(Ω)ci ≥ pi(s)− ci, (24)
or equivalently if
ci ≥ 1− x(Ω)
1− p(Ω) [pi(s)− pi(h)] ≡ c∗(Ω). (25)
At the same time this policy will dominate ‘always dirty’ if
x(Ω)pi(s) + [1− x(Ω)]pi(h)− p(Ω)ci ≥ pi(h), (26)
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or equivalently if
ci ≤ x(Ω)
p(Ω)
[pi(s)− pi(h)] ≡ c∗(Ω). (27)
The range [c∗, c∗] is non-trivial (that is, we have c∗(Ω) > c∗(Ω)) whenever
x(Ω)
p(Ω)
>
1−x(Ω)
1−p(Ω) , or equivalently, whenever x(Ω) > p(Ω). This condition has an easy interpre-
tation – such opportunistic policies dominate both ‘always clean’ and ‘always dirty’
for some intermediate values of ci whenever episodes of clean behaviour can deliver
community support for disproportionately long periods.6
The existence of such an intermediate range of ci where the firm chooses to
be clean for only a fraction of the time implies departures from social optimality
which, recall, requires that the firm choose clean whenever ci < b and remain dirty
otherwise.
To illustrate this argument consider a setting in which community attitudes
depend on the firm’s most recent choice and its choice in the previous period (in
other words on its two-period history). Limiting community recall to only one
previous period allows us some tractability: longer periods of recall can be handled
with additional complexity. With one-period recall, the typical state in any period is
given by the conjunction of the current attitude of the community and its observed
history of the firm’s choice in the previous period. For instance, state (s,Dt−1) at
time t describes a community that is supportive despite its recollection that the firm
had been dirty in the previous period. The set of possible states at time t is then:
{(s, Ct−1), (s,Dt−1), (h, Ct−1), (h,Dt−1)}.
As before the evolution of community feelings is given by a Markov process, which
describes the transitions across the four history-contingent states. In the spirit of
our previous setting, we assume that if the community is already supportive clean
behaviour in the current period preserves that support. Similarly, if the community
is already hostile, dirty behaviour in the current period preserves that hostility.
6Proposition 3 is a special case of this result. Without history-dependence, under policy DC,
the community is supportive (and the firm dirty in response) for fraction γβ+γ of the time, while
the community is hostile (and firm clean) for fraction ββ+γ . So x(DC) = γβ+γ and p(DC) = ββ+γ .
Whenever x(DC) > p(DC) or, equivalently γ > β, there exists a range of ci for which policy DC
dominates both CC and DD.
Further, the underlying argument holds for any policy, including non-steady-state ones. Focusing
on steady state policy provide us the tractability to evaluate x(Ω) and p(Ω).
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However, to allow community attitudes to be shaped by the past record of the
firm we assume that dirty behaviour is more likely to render a supportive community
hostile if there is previous history of dirty behaviour. Specifically, let β1 be the
probability that repeated dirty behaviour Dt−1Dt triggers hostility, while β0 is the
corresponding probability for Ct−1Dt. We assume that β1 > β0.
Similarly we assume clean behaviour is more likely to restore community support
if there is a track record of clean behaviour. Specifically, let γ0 be the probability
that repeated clean behaviour Ct−1Ct restores support, while γ1 is the corresponding
probability for Dt−1Ct. We assume that γ0 > γ1.
A policy specifies an action for every state, where states are listed in the order
specified above. For instance, under policy CCCC the firm chooses clean in each of
the four possible state. Under the more opportunistic policy DDCC it chooses dirty
for states in which the community is supportive and clean whenever it is hostile. The
richer set of history-contingent state allows for more nuanced policies: for instance,
the policy DDDC is even more opportunistic, requiring clean behaviour only in the
face of a hostile community that remembers previous dirty action.
With four states and two actions in every state, there are 16 distinct policies. As
before we could compare the steady-state payoffs across all these policies but our
analysis is eased by the fact that some policies are payoff-equivalent, allowing us to
focus on a smaller selection of policies.
The payoff to some policies is straightforward to evaluate. The ‘unconditionally
clean’ policy CCCC preserves community support forever and has a net payoff of
Π(s)−Ci. The ‘unconditionally dirty’ policy DDDD has a net payoff of Π(h). The
steady-state payoffs associated with other policies require more careful calculation.
For instance, the opportunistic policy DCCC, which calls for clean behaviour in
every state except (s, Ct−1) will involve repeated transitions between various states.
Replicating arguments along previous lines, we can show that this opportunistic
policy dominates both the ‘unconditionally clean’ policy CCCC and ‘unconditionally
dirty’ policy DDDD for some range of costs.7
Of course, that some policy dominates both CCCC and DDDD for some range
of costs does not imply that it is necessarily the best among all available policies.
The firm’s optimal CSR strategy might involve selection of different policies for
7Specifically, policy DCCC dominates policies CCCC and DDDD when ci lies in interval [c∗, c∗],
where c∗ =
β0(1+γ0−γ1)
γ0
pi and c∗ = γ0(2−β0)γ0+β0(1−γ1)pi. Here c
∗ > c∗ if and only if γ0(1−β0) > β0(1−γ1).
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Range of costs Optimal policy, Ω Fraction of time clean, p(Ω)
0 < ci ≤ 0.55 CCCC 1
0.55 < ci ≤ 1 DCCC 0.56
1 < ci ≤ 1.5 DDCC 0.4
1.5 < ci DDDD 0
Table 1: Optimal CSR policy and preponderance of clean behaviour
different ranges of the cost parameter. A complete analytical characterization of the
firm’s optimal policy is neither straightforward, nor particularly illuminating, but a
numerical illustration might help.
Let γ0 = 0.6, γ1 = 0.5, β1 = 0.4 and β0 = 0.3. Assume that [pi(s) − pi(h)] = 1,
so that cost of being clean ci is measured relative to increment in profitability from
a supportive rather than hostile community. Given these values by evaluating the
expected return to various policies in different ranges, the optimal CSR policy for
the firm contingent on its cost realization ci is as in Table 1.
In this example we find that the optimal CSR policy involves three discrete
‘steps’ (in terms of likelihood of clean behaviour) at critical values that depend on
the transition probability parameters. In contrast, recall that the socially-optimal
policy calls for a single step at b. The same qualitative insights obtain here as in
the basic version presented in Section 3: If there are multiple steps then first-best is
necessarily compromised; if there is a single step then that step must coincide with
equality of pi and b, which would require a particular set of conditions to hold by
chance.
5 Extension: Taxation
How does the existence of community pressure articulate with the desirability and
efficacy of formal regulatory instruments such as environmental taxation? Assume
that the firm’s choices – clean or dirty – can be observed directly by a regulator
who can choose to tax dirty behaviour at rate t ≥ 0. We will assume that tax is
purely redistributive so does not feature in welfare except through impact on the
firm’s choice.8
8In other words the marginal value of social funds is 1, in effect abstracting from so-called
‘double dividend’ considerations. This could be varied, to make revenue-raising an end in its own
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Proposition 7 Absent the threat of community hostility, first-best can be imple-
mented with a regime that imposes tax t = b on the action ‘dirty’.
To see why note that if community attitudes do not affect firm profitability, the
penalty pi(s) − pi(h) disappears. Any deterrent effect will then come from taxation
alone. In any period, a firm will choose clean if and only if t ≥ ci. If t is set equal
to b, the firm will choose clean if and only if b ≥ ci, which corresponds to first-best.
This is simply a Pigovian tax or charge on the externality that flows from the action
‘dirty’.
This provides a useful benchmark. If taxes are available as an enforcement
mechanism, they can achieve efficient policy management. First-best outcomes can
be implemented with a straightforward Pigovian tax. We have already established
(Proposition 5) that CSR is generically inconsistent with achievement of first-best
outcomes, so if the choice is between a self-standing, well-designed tax regime and a
system of incentives based on community hostility, the former is necessarily preferred
in our setting.
The welfare analysis in Section 3 was in terms of deviations from first-best, but
it can equally be interpreted as deviation from what could be achieved by judicious
use of taxation.
5.1 Taxation and community pressure
What is the optimal environmental tax given the existence of community pressure?
In most applied settings formal and informal incentives coexist (see, for example,
Wang (2000), Pargal and Wheeler (1996)). Disclosure programs (designed to lever-
age public pressure for enhanced performance) will usually be introduced in settings
where there is at least some existing formal policy (perhaps a tax). It is, therefore,
interesting to explore how the two mechanisms articulate.
In the model here we have made no attempt to provide a micro-foundation for
how hostility is aroused and assuaged. Once we introduce other formal instruments,
however, we might wish to revisit our assumptions about how public attitudes are
formed. In a different setting Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) present experimental
evidence that the introduction of a tax (or fine) can legitimize behaviour otherwise
seen as anti-social. In our setting, for example, local residents may be less likely to
right, enhancing the attractiveness of taxation.
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get angry with local plants that spew contaminants into the local environment if
those emissions have been ‘legitimized’ by being taxed.
In what follows we extend our basic (memory-less) model by assuming that
dirty behaviour in any period incurs a unit tax t. We allow for the possibility
that community hostility towards polluters is softened by taxation. If taxation
‘legitimizes’ dirty behaviour it might lower the likelihood of triggering hostility.
Specifically, we assume that the transition probability β is a decreasing function of
the tax rate t, so that β′(t) < 0 for all t ≥ 0. For the sake of tractability assume all
other parameters are fixed. Taxation affects the expected return to different policies
so we should expect the firm’s choice of CSR policy to be sensitive to the tax rate,
with optimal policy now denoted as Ω∗(ci, t).
As before we focus on cases where β(t) < γ, for which the optimal CSR policy
involves switching at cost thresholds, now labeled as c∗(t) and c∗(t).9 To determine
these thresholds, note first that ECC is invariant to t: as policy ΩCC never results in
dirty behaviour, taxes are never paid. EDC, however, is modified by taxation: we
have
EDC(Ci, t) = ω∗DC(t)
(
Π(s)− t
1−δ
)
+ (1− ω∗DC(t))(Π(h)− Ci). (24)
Higher tax reduces the firm’s payoff whenever it chooses dirty and also increases the
proportion ω∗DC(t) =
γ
β(t)+γ
of time spent in the supportive state by lowering β(t),
the probability of transition to the hostile state. We find that EDC(ci, t) > ECC(ci, t)
if and only if ci exceeds the tax-modified threshold c∗(t), where
c∗(t) =
(
β(t)
γ
)
[pi(s)− pi(h)] + t ≤ c∗(0) + t. (25)
Here c∗(0) is the value of this threshold when the tax rate is zero. The introduction
of a tax raises the lower threshold by an amount less than the tax. Similar arguments
show that taxation pushes up the upper threshold too, but by an amount greater
than tax t:
c∗(t) =
(
γ
β(t)
)
[pi(s)− pi(h)] + t ≥ c∗(0) + t. (26)
Note that if β(t) does not vary with t, both thresholds rise precisely by the tax t.
We analyze how the social loss, relative to the first-best, varies with the level
of taxation. We evaluate the variation in social loss in the neighborhood of t = 0.
9The other case, where β > γ is straightforward. Here the rational policy for the firm is to
choose ΩCC for ci < pi+ t, and ΩDD otherwise. The optimal tax rate equals b− pi in this situation,
that is, at a level that corrects for the insufficiency of communal penalty relative to social benefits
of clean behaviour.
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This allows us to assess whether, starting from a regime of CSR without taxation,
whether or not the introduction of a tax improves welfare.
Inserting t as an argument in the expression for social loss, SL(t), we consider
three sub-cases that differ in the magnitude of b relative to the thresholds c∗(t) and
c∗(t). Suppose, first, that b > c∗(0). Recall that here informal regulation does not
induce enough clean behaviour. We modify the relevant expression for social loss –
see (21) – to incorporate the dependence of the thresholds on t, as in (25) and (26).
Then differentiating with respect to t and using the facts that 0 < ∂c∗(t)
∂t
≤ 1 ≤ ∂c∗(t)
∂t
,
we have
dSL(t)
dt |t=0, b>c∗
=−
[
γ
β+γ
(b− c∗)f(c∗)dc∗dt + ββ+γ (b− c∗)f(c∗)dc
∗
dt
]
− γβ′(t)
(β+γ)2
∫ c∗
c∗ (b− ci)f(c)dc.
(27)
If taxation does not affect community reactions, that is if β′(t) = 0, social loss is
unambiguously decreasing in t in the neighborhood of t = 0. The optimal tax rate is
positive. However, when β′(t) < 0, it could overturn this recommendation. Imagine
a situation where a minuscule tax robs informal regulation of all of its potency.
Then it may be preferable, in welfare terms, to have no taxation than to dilute the
deterrent effect of community pressure.
This welfare ambiguity of taxation can be illustrated with a simple numerical ex-
ample. Consistent with our previous example, assume that c is distributed uniformly
in the interval [0, 2]; that pi = 1 and γ = 0.6. Assume now that β(t) = 0.4e−ρt: here
ρ determines the sensitivity of the community hostility parameter to taxation t. Let
b = 2, so that as required for this case, we have b > c∗(0). It is straightforward to
check that the optimal tax rate is positive when β(t) is not very sensitive to t (that
is, ρ is small or zero). However, if ρ is larger than, say, 4, SL(t) is increasing in t at
t = 0, so that optimal tax is zero.
Next consider the case where b < c∗(0). Here community hostility induces too
much compliance relative to the low social benefit of clean behaviour. Once again,
if β′(t) = 0, social loss is increasing in t, so that the optimal tax rate is zero.
(Indeed, if negative rates of taxation were available – a subsidy for dirty behaviour
– they would be desirable to compensate the firm for the loss inflicted by an overly
hostile population). However, if β′(t) < 0, we can construct numerical examples
where social loss is decreasing in t in the neighborhood of t = 0, so positive rates of
taxation may help to mitigate community hostility.
We summarize our findings for these two cases as:
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Proposition 8 (i) If community attitude does not depend on the tax rate (or is
sufficiently insensitive to it) the optimal tax on dirty behaviour is positive whenever
b > c∗(0) and non-positive whenever b < c∗(0). (ii) These results may be reversed if
community attitude is sufficiently sensitive to the tax rate.
Finally we turn to the case where c∗(0) < b < c∗(0), where
dSL(t)
dt |t=0, b∈(c∗,c∗)
=− γ
β+γ
(b− c∗)f(c∗)dc∗dt + ββ+γ (c∗ − b)f(c∗)dc
∗
dt
− γβ′(t)
(β+γ)2
[∫ b
c∗(b− ci)f(c)dc−
∫ c∗
b
(ci − b)f(c)dc
]
.
(28)
Here the welfare impact of taxation is ambiguous even when β′(t) = 0. The introduc-
tion of a tax encourages more clean behaviour at the c∗(0) margin, which decreases
social loss (that is, increases welfare) since c∗ < b. But it also encourages more clean
behaviour at the c∗(0) margin, which lowers welfare because b < c∗(0). The overall
impact will depend upon the size of these two effects, and on the distribution F (c):
it cannot be determined in general. The ambiguity is further complicated by the
possibility that β is itself sensitive to t.
Proposition 9 If c∗(0) < b < c∗(0) the imposition of a tax may increase or decrease
welfare.
Once again, a numerical example helps. Using the parameter configuration de-
scribed earlier and assuming that ρ = 0 (so that β does not vary with t), social loss
is increasing in t when b is less than unity: in this case zero taxation is better than
positive taxation. If, however, b > 1, social loss is decreasing in t, which calls for
positive taxes.
6 Discussion
Optimistic commentators have promoted the idea that informal regulation – commu-
nities bringing pressure to bear upon firms – could replace more formal approaches
in some settings, or usefully complement regulatory instruments such as taxation
in others (Tietenberg (1998)). Such views underpin community right-to-know type
policies.
26
Our results call into question the generality of these ideas. In our set-up the
incentives generated by community pressure can never be as efficient as a well-
functioning system of taxation, unless a particular coincidence of parameter values
happens to pertain. Further those incentives may be welfare-reducing against a
benchmark of no intervention. We also highlight the idea that complementarity
between the formal instruments (in our case taxation) and informal pressure cannot
be taken for granted – incentives may interact in a way that is unhelpful from a
welfare perspective.
Further, in calibrating a tax (or other formal policy instrument) a policy-maker
needs to make adjustment for the fact that community pressure may also be influ-
encing pollution decisions. If, for example, a disclosure program is operating and
effective, then the optimal emissions tax is not one necessarily calibrated to the
standard Pigovian norm.
We adopted a Markov approach to modeling, though other approaches could have
been used. The regime-switching view of community attitude – with the community
potentially flip-flopping between support and hostility according to the recent (and
perhaps not so recent) behaviour of a firm – seems natural. The analysis incor-
porates two aspects of community pressure. First, that firm behaviour may affect
community attitudes in only a ‘noisy’ fashion. Whether an act of environmental
transgression generates popular outrage may depends on public awareness of that
act (what else was in the news that day?), on whether a critical mass of citizens
are offended, and on the murky dynamics of ‘group think’. Equally, whether or
not community hostility is assuaged by subsequent environmental compliance may
depend on practical details such as media management. This inherent noisiness is
well captured by a Markov process, with a firm’s action determining the state of
community attitude but only in a stochastic manner. Second, the penalty imposed
by community hostility may be only loosely related to the true social cost of any
environmental transgression. The channels through which a community may pun-
ish transgression (with-holding custom for a period, social ostracism of employees,
etc.) are not subject to optimal calibration (or even measurement) in the way in
which penalties in a formal regulatory setting could be. Of course formal regulation
is not perfect and usually riddled by informational and other problems associated
with costly enforcement. But at least in theory the penalties associated with formal
regulation can be matched to firm choices.
There are limitations to the Markov approach. While community attitudes at
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any given moment are endogenous to the model, the process by which they evolve
are guided by parameters – in our case, γ and β – that are not. They have not,
for example, come out of any process of ‘optimization’ by the community. This
seems like a reasonable starting assumption, given our limitations in understanding
how community attitudes are shaped, but future work could focus on understanding
these transition probabilities.
Our comparison of informal regulation with a tax regime was biased – the con-
text was deliberately framed in such a way that tax could obtain first best – but
instructive. The two-step pattern of clean behaviour generated by community pres-
sure was qualitatively distinct from the one-step pattern generated by the optimal
tax and required for first-best. Of course in any real setting there may be other
impediments to execution of an optimal tax regime, for example where regulatory
governance is less than perfect. We can acknowledge that informal regulation may
be particularly relied upon precisely in those sorts of settings.
How the incentives for clean behaviour that community pressure generate may
interact with other policy initiatives is an important thing to consider. There has
been a presumption that when formal incentives are inadequate, informal incentives
will simply ‘top them up’. But this sort of additivity cannot be taken for granted
– informal and formal interventions are not necessarily complementary. This theme
would be worth exploring in the case of instruments other than the pollution taxa-
tion.
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